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Property Rights in Organs –
An Argument for Commodification of the Body
I.

Introduction
Every year thousands of people die waiting for an organ transplant in the United States.

The supply of organs available for transplantation, either gifts from deceased patients or
donations from a living relative, is grossly inadequate to meet the demands of the medical
community with a system that remains strictly dependent on altruistic donations. Despite the
inadequate supply of donated organs, the sale of human organs is still illegal in this country.
Realizing the insurmountable obstacle of obtaining enough donated organs to meet the needs of
patients, a commercial market in organs would offer a practical alternative.
The National Organ Transplantation Act, passed on October 19, 1984, banned the sale of
organs, stating “it shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly acquire, receive, or otherwise
transfer any human organ for valuable consideration for use in human transplantation if the
transfer affects interstate commerce.”1 The Secretary of the Department of Health and Human
Services works with non-profit organizations to operate the Organ Procurement and
Transplantation Network, which maintains a national list of patients who need transplants and
distributes available organs based on a patient’s position on the list.2 The selection of patients
from the list for a transplant is “based on medical criteria that are publicly stated and fairly
applied.”3 However, if two or more people are medically ready and capable of a transplant,
physicians and other medical personnel make the choice as to who should receive the transplant
based on weighing the patients’ social worth. This determination is purely subjective with
considerations that include marital status and number of dependents, income, educational
1
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background, employment record, relationship to authority figures, past irresponsible behavior,
and intelligence.4
This paper by no means argues that commodification of the body through the sale of
organs is an ideal situation and perhaps it is not even a morally desirable one. However, this
paper will attempt to dispel the concerns behind the commercialization of organs to prove that no
practical, moral or philosophical concern is great enough to undermine the good that could come
from a commercial market in organs. “Commodification is not always the worst-best.
Sometimes it is just second best – in a world in which first best isn’t feasible, and other options
are even worse than second best.”5
Part II of this paper proposes a potential regulatory system to oversee the commercial
market in human organs. It also presents some possibilities to overcome administrative
difficulties, discussed later in further detail, in establishing this market in an attempt to display
the ease and effectiveness under which the market could operate. Part III will address the origin
of a potential property right in human organs and the emergence of recognition of these rights by
the courts and public. This section presents an account of all types of property rights identified
in the human body, beginning with the familial right to a relative’s body after death and detailing
rights in regenerable human tissue such as blood and other tissue. The first subsection in Part IV
outlines the practical and moral concerns that commonly arise in the debate over the
commodification of organs and attempts to dispel these concerns. Finally, the second section of
Part IV introduces some popular philosophical arguments against an open market in organs,
Gloria J. Banks, Legal and Ethical Safeguards: Protection of Society’s Most Vulnerable Participants in a
Commercialized Organ Transplantation System, 21 AM. J.L. & MED. 45, 47 (1995). See also NEW YORK STATE
TASK FORCE ON LIFE AND THE LAW, TRANSPLANTATION IN NEW YORK STATE: THE PROCUREMENT AND
DISTRIBUTION OF ORGANS AND TISSUES (1988).
5
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4

2

demonstrating reasons that these theories should not stand in the way of commodification and
providing philosophical approaches that support an organ market.
II.

Proposal
As a practical matter, establishing a well-regulated market for organs would be a

challenging feat. However, through legalization, all of the problems with the black market in
live human organs can be remedied. The first step to establishing a successful commercial
market is creating a framework for the regulation of the market.
Under my proposal, the pre-existing Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network,
already established to maintain the waiting list of patients in need of an organ transplant, would
supervise the acquisition of the organs from “vendors”. An individual who desires to sell an
organ would initially be interviewed to ensure that informed consent is present. The individual
would undergo medical tests to verify their health and the health of the organ in question. If
approved, the Network would pay the individual a fixed price for the organ and would make
arrangements for the transplantation into the recipient. The process would remain strictly
anonymous to ensure both fairness and privacy for all of the involved parties. Recipients would
still be chosen based on the criteria of the existing waiting list. However, the goal of the
program is to eventually eradicate the need for a waiting list by having a list of willing vendors
available when a patient’s need initially arises.
Concerns about the unequal access among economic classes to these paid organs would
need to be addressed. The Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network would pay the
anonymous donors through federal funding and charitable donations, rather than the patients
paying out of their own pockets. Alternatively, medical insurance could cover the cost of the
3

organ in conjunction with the operation and follow-up care. Although this would create an
added burden on the medical insurance companies, eliminating the patient’s time period of
waiting for an organ, often spanning years in duration, would reduce overall medical costs, such
as costly dialysis for kidney patients, for maintaining sick patients in hospitals until a transplant
is possible. The cost of obtaining the organ would be treated as another medical expense for the
operation, essentially the same as the cost of anesthetic or anti-rejection medications.
Concerns of threats to health, exploitation, or coercion can easily be overcome by
establishing a well-organized regulatory system. The designated body would determine if the
person attempting to sell the organ is in suitable health for the operation and has freely consented
to the sale. These types of quality controls will be discussed further in section IV of this paper.
A fixed price, determined by the Network, for each organ will prevent exploitation and ensure all
vendors are treated equally.
Even if none of the arguments for establishing a market in organs from live donors are
convincing, a futures contract could be a morally non-objectionable alternative. Contracting
during an individual’s life for the option to harvest organs after the individual’s death in
exchange for a fixed price given to the person’s estate eliminates the risks to the donor and the
philosophical objections to disturbing a healthy body.6 Additionally, a futures contract
encourages everyone, perhaps with the exception of those with religious objections, to become
an organ donor at death.
III.

6
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Property is defined as “the right to possess, use, and enjoy a determinate thing.”7 The
determination of the character of a thing as property is often reduced to whether the “bundle” of
property rights applies to the thing.8 The bundle of rights includes the right to possess, control,
exclude others from, enjoy and dispose of the thing. Although not a popular notion for
sentimental reasons, one’s body can be viewed as the property of oneself, meeting all of the
characteristics of the bundle of property rights.
One of the clearest signs of the presence of property rights in a human organ is the ability
to gift the organ because without a prior ownership entitlement in the organ, a person would be
unauthorized to give it away, even without compensation. Rather than solely analyzing gifts in
the controversial context of an organ donation, some analogies from everyday life present a
clearer understanding of the implications of a gift.
In practice, gifts of all types are rarely entirely voluntary as they often stem from
obligation and the threat of social consequence. Estate law provides an example of gifts that are
conducted under legal supervision and closely documented, thus providing a reliable context for
some examples for our analysis. If, for example, an individual is excluded from a will and can
demonstrate a promise to devise property in exchange for repayment of some type of work, often
the individual can prevail on a court action compelling the transfer.9 Additionally, the doctrine
of undue influence lies on the premise that a person did not do enough for the testator during her
lifetime to warrant the gift.10 Both of these legal ‘gifts’ are truly examples of exchanges of the

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (Bryan A. Garner et al. eds., 9th ed. 2009).
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9
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bequest for lifetime care or attention; therefore, under these principles, the same considerations
that allow people to donate organs support allowing the sale.11
Although a gift market and a money market are regarded as separate entities that often do
not overlap, both share similar elements that, I would contend, display the possibility for a
working commercial system where previously only gifts were recognized as legitimate. Similar
to a bequest in a will, all exchanges, including the exchange of an organ for money, contain an
element of a gift. No exchange is ever entirely equal but instead rests on the economic system of
supply and demand.12 If a person offered to trade your one dollar bill for a one dollar bill from
her wallet, the exchange would not accomplish anything and thus there would be no purpose to
conduct it. However, if a person offered to exchange a one dollar bill for a bar of candy, the
exchange would be worthwhile depending on your goals. If you believe a bar of candy is worth
sacrificing your one dollar bill, the exchange would occur. Although most people would agree
this exchange is roughly equal, being that a bar of candy would generally cost about one dollar,
the participants of the exchange could argue about gains and losses indefinitely depending on the
individuals’ views on the worth of each item. Inevitably, in any exchange, one individual will
have to give something society may view as more valuable in order to accomplish what she
wants out of the transaction. The exchange, however, is satisfactory to both parties because the
result is that each has obtained what they desired.
Relating to the context of organ transplantation, an individual may wish to sell her organ
to obtain money for any number of purposes that she views as more important than the sacrifice
of the organ. Incontestably, society views the organ as precious and, to many people, invaluable.

11
12

RONALD MUNSON, RAISING THE DEAD: ORGAN TRANSPLANTS, ETHICS AND SOCIETY 122 (2002).
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 5, at 119.
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However, if the “vendor” is selling a kidney to provide money to pay for life-saving treatment of
their child, the exchange becomes worthwhile and the loss of the kidney seems trivial. Since
both parties are better off after the exchange takes place, the monetary exchange should be
treated as equally valid as any other market transaction fulfilling a supply and demand for a
certain type of property.
a. Early Development of Property Rights in the Body
The common current view is that people have property rights in human cadavers.13
Common law recognized a familial right to bury one’s dead, as is accepted and in fact expected
today.14 Rights and laws protecting the body and its products exist in the prohibition of slavery
and false imprisonment, ability to contract for employment, and existence of assault and battery
laws.15 Though a person is prohibited from alienating parts of her body, an individual is
permitted, in fact encouraged, to donate organs to patients in need.
The introduction of a market in human organs should be analyzed in the context of the
existing treatment of other parts of the body. A legal commercial market for certain types of
living human tissue already exists. Blood plasma, sperm and eggs are routinely extracted from
willing patients in exchange for compensation. In the United States, there are over 400 blood
banks.16 The United States’ two billion dollar industry in exporting blood leads the world.17 The
success of the blood market strongly supports the inference that an organ market could be
productive and effective.
13

Paul A. Gerike, Human Biological Material: A Proprietary Interest or Part of the Monistic Being?, 17 OHIO
N.U.L. REV. 805, 812 (1991).
14
Ibid.
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Danielle M. Wagner, Property Rights in the Human Body: The Commercialization of Organ Transplantation and
Biotechnology, 33 DUQ. L. REV. 931, 933 (1995).
16
WAGNER, supra note 15, at 945.
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Many of the criticisms that are offered against commercializing human organs were once
presented to prevent the blood and tissues market. However, today, the market in blood and
other regenerable human tissues is openly accepted by society. One of the most common
concerns before the market was instituted18 was the possibility of declining safety and health. In
one of the most influential books on the topic, entitled The Gift Relationship: From Human
Blood to Social Policy, Richard Titmuss argued that a commercial blood market enhanced the
risk of hepatitis-contaminated blood over a system of voluntary donations.19 His research,
however, was conducted decades ago, with the publication of his book in 1970, and his
conclusions are criticized as overly broad based on the evidence obtained.20 Today, due to
adequate protective screening and monitoring, the blood and tissues market in the United States
is now viewed as almost entirely free of risk.21 “The experiences with blood demonstrate that
many of the charges levied against an open market in bodily organs are baseless.”22
Although the market in human organs is not yet legal, there is an active black market for
live donor organs. Wealthy people travel to foreign countries seeking organ transplantation and
pay hundreds of thousands of dollars for the procedure while risking questionable healthcare
standards in addition to enabling the exploitation of people willing to sell their organs in these
source countries.23 If the market were legal, the owner of the organ would receive more money
rather than splitting the proceeds with middle-men who charge large commissions because of the

18

Many criticisms of the blood market existed at the time, paralleling criticisms of a market in organs. However, for
my purposes here, the safety concern is most relevant to the discussion.
19
RICHARD TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY (1971).
20
Robert M. Solow, Blood and Thunder, 80 YALE L. J. 1696 (1971).
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No medical treatment or procedure can be entirely free of risk.
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David E. Jefferies, The Body as Commodity: The Use of Markets to Cure the Organ Deficit, 5 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 621, 657 (1997-1998).
23
Growing Demand Fuels Black Market Organ Trade (Mar. 13, 2013, 10:00 AM),
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assumption of the legal risks.24 Because of the legal status, the organ would already be paid for
through the Organ Network and the fees charged to the recipient would include only legitimate
medical expenses. Additionally, there would be less safety concerns for both the “vendor” and
the recipient if reputable doctors and hospitals handled the operations.
b. Modern Recognition of Property Rights in the Body
Numerous recent court cases shed light on the emergence of the acknowledgement of
property rights in human bodies. Although refusing to directly acknowledge property rights in
body parts, courts have begun to recognize a property interest in parts of the body through a gift
doctrine.25 Though the courts’ rhetoric states that individuals do not have a property interest in
their bodies, the recognition that parts of the body can be gifted to a person or organization
mandates that the donor had an ownership right to grant to another.
In Moore v. Regents of University of California, a patient brought a conversion claim for
the use of bodily tissues and portions of the patient’s spleen in research to establish a cell line
that was later patented.26 Though the conversion claim was unsuccessful, the court reasoned that
the patient did not maintain an ownership interest in excised tissues, allowing the implication
that the patient had this ownership interest prior to removal of the tissue.
In Greenburg v. Miami Children’s Hospital Res. Inst., patients and non-profit
organizations who provided funding sued a physician who isolated the Canavan gene (present in
a rare genetic disorder) and obtained a patent. 27 Although the court in Greenburg explicitly

24

RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION, supra note 5, at 407.
Remigius N. Nwabueze, Donated Organs, Property Rights and the Remedial Quagmire, 16 MED. L. REV. 201,
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27
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stated that patients did not have a property interest in their body tissue, the ruling explained that
the patients were the donors of the tissues.28 The implication of the patients’ donor status shows
that they had property rights in their tissues, without which the donation of the tissue would be
impossible.
In Washington University v. Catalona, Washington University sought a declaratory
judgment that it owned human tissue that had been used in research conducted by a doctor at the
University who had transferred to Northwestern University and wished to bring the tissue
samples with him.29 The court, after implying that patients initially had property rights in their
tissues, found that inter vivos gifts had been made by the patients to Washington University and
therefore the University was the owner of the tissue samples.30
At common law, the ability to donate through a gift doctrine requires that the donor has
“the necessary disposing power,”31 which must intrinsically be linked to the power of property
because one cannot give something that one does not have.32 Despite the fact that courts have
not openly recognized a property interest in bodily tissue, the finding that a donation or gift can
legally be made necessarily implies a property interest of some sort in the body.
Courts are also beginning to recognize a property interest in deceased relative’s body
parts.33 Although the outcome of these types of litigation often rest on the practical difficulties
of medical examiners sharing all concerns with next of kin, the acceptance by courts of the idea

28

NWABUEZE, supra note 25, at 220.
Washington University v. Catalona, 437 F.Supp.2d 985 (Dist. Ct. Missouri 2006).
30
Id. at 997.
31
Bowman v. Secular Society Ltd. [1917] A.C. 406.
32
For discussion, see NWABUEZE, supra note 25, at 220.
33
See Hainey v. Parrott, 617 F.Supp.2d 668 (S.D. Ohio 2007)(settlement approved for class action for practice of
corner’s office to retain body parts and organs of decedents without notice to next of kin or opportunity to reclaim
body parts); See also Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991)(recognizing a constitutionally-protected
interest in a deceased person’s corneas that were removed without consent and without investigative purpose).
29
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of constitutionally protected34 property rights in the body of a deceased relative displays the
change of attitude recognizing that the body is the property of an individual, or the in event of
death, of the individual’s family.
Even where courts fail to recognize a property interest in body parts, the failure rests
solely on a deficiency in state law that fails to grant a right to a decedent’s body parts that are
collected for forensic examination at death.35 In Albrecht v. Treon, the Sixth Circuit Court found that
a § 1983 claim could not stand because Ohio state law did not grant a property interest in body parts.36
Treon was distinguishable from Brotherton, where the court found a constitutionally-protected interest in
a deceased person’s corneas, because the body parts were removed for forensic examination in a criminal
investigation.37 Despite being a relatively new issue, news media is drawing attention to the issue

of body parts retained after autopsy and legislation is beginning to address the issue.38 Once
legislation recognizes an individual’s property right in their body, either before or after death, the
foundation for the commercial market in human organs will be laid.
c. Overcoming Inalienability
Even if property rights in human organs are acknowledged, another obstacle in the
establishment of a commercial market in organs is the recognition that certain types of property
are inalienable and cannot be bought and sold in a market-like setting. However, based on my
proposed system of regulation of the market, the justifications for inalienability no longer exist
and therefore do not prevent the creation of a successful commercial market in human organs.

34

This right is constitutionally protected under the due process clause.
See Albrecht v. Treon, 617 F.3d 890 (6th Cir. 2010)
36
Ibid.
37
Ibid.
38
Mark Hansen, THE BODY IN QUESTION, 6 No. 25 ABA J. E-REPORT 4 (discussing legislation passed by San Mateo
County, CA, in 2007 that required corners to notify next of kin when body parts of a deceased relative are retained
for testing or examination after an autopsy).
35
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Susan Rose-Ackerman in her article, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights,
explores possible justifications for inalienability in certain types of property rights.39 RoseAckerman describes organ transplantation as a type of property right that falls under the category
of modified inalienability, meaning that gifts are permitted but sales are not.40 She believes
externalities provide “the most commonly recognized rationale for inalienability rules.”41 RoseAckerman begins with the presumption that unencumbered markets are desirable and therefore
limits on transferability must be justified.42 Thus, if these reasons are not valid, the market
should be permitted to operate. The justifications offered for the modified inalienability rule
include economic efficiency and “specialized distributive goals” achievable only through
inalienability rules.43
Rose-Ackerman believes the most important efficiency justifications for a modified
inalienability rule are: (1) conservation and supply management; (2) the regulation of close
substitutes; and (3) the assurance of high quality output, though these justifications apply only in
selective circumstances and thus “modified inalienability should not be used to achieve
distributive goals except to prevent monopolies.”44 The underpinning of the conservation and
supply management justification is that the market itself creates an inefficiency because the
higher levels of supply triggered by the presence of the market would “impose external costs on
society.” 45 Rose-Ackerman presents population control and the conservation of wild animals
and primitive cultures as examples of this phenomenon. However, in the case of a market in
human organs, the increase in supply would alleviate problems plaguing society by making more
39

Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 931, 937 (1985).
Id. at 935.
41
Id. at 939.
42
Id. at 932.
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Ibid.
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ROSE-ACKERMAN, supra note 39, at 932.
45
Id. at 942
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medically necessary transplants possible. The justification of the regulation of close substitutes
rests on the fact that it is difficult to enforce a law against the possession or transfer of a
forbidden good where there is a close substitute, such as in the case of the Endangered Species
Act and the Migratory Bird Treaties. This justification is also irrelevant to human organs
because there is no substitute for an organ. In fact, if a close and meaningful substitute existed
for an organ, the market in human organs would be unnecessary because the substitute would
suffice to fulfill the present medical need. The final justification regarding quality control is one
of the most significant criticisms of a market in organs. This problem will be dealt with in detail
in the following section.
Susan Rose-Ackerman argues against the distributive arguments for inalienability of
blood, which also arise in the context of human organs.46 Rose-Ackerman suggests that the
quality control arguments for modified inalienability of blood exist only on the supply side of the
market and therefore donated blood could be sold to patients without concern for jeopardizing
the quality of the donations. She further attempts to solve the newly-created problem of
discouraged volunteers, stemming from the fact that their donations will be sold, by offering
solutions such as the payment of the donors’ expenses. However, she acknowledges that blood
is unique in that the human body automatically replaces that which is lost and therefore the donor
has not lost anything. While suggesting the opposite of Rose-Ackerman’s idea by creating a
market solely on the supply side, the proposal set forth in this paper dispenses with the quality
control argument through a strict system of regulation and monitoring. Because the organ
“vendors” are fully compensated for the organ that they sacrifice, no problem of a shortage of
supply arises. Additionally, as the “vendors” are compensated, the fact that the organ, in the case

46

Id. at 948
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of kidneys, does not regenerate is a sacrifice that is deemed acceptable in exchange for the
financial incentive received.
Criticisms of a commercial blood or organ market based on distributive reasons also
oppose the sale based on the ground that it would be unfair to allocate life-saving resources on
the basis of a recipient’s ability to pay. Rose-Ackerman rationalizes that the distributive
arguments “may not be strong enough to overcome the inefficiency of nonmarket transactions”
and thus, despite practical difficulties, it may be advantageous to accept a market that will
account for the problems created by a modified inalienability rule, mainly the shortage of
supply.47 Additionally, “on purely distributive grounds, it seems unfair to treat people whose
problem requires a mechanical or chemical solution [such as an artificial limb] differently from
those who need living tissue.”48 However, Rose-Ackerman fears a “monopoly power issue” in
which a donor could require a large payment in return for donating to a person who has a rare
blood type or cannot find another suitable tissue match.49 However, in the system that I have
proposed in this paper, distribution problems would be eradicated through the anonymity of the
system and the fixed prices and thus cannot justify inalienability of organs.
In the article Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed also argue that inalienability stems from
the high external costs of allowing certain types of markets.50 They suggest that rules of
inalienability “seem most often germane in situations where moralisms are involved.”51
Moralisms are external costs which “do not lend themselves to collective measurement which is

47

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Id. at 949
50
Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rights, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1111-14 (1972).
51
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acceptably objective and non-arbitrary.”52 Although it may not be the current popular opinion,
no moral harm should be considered more detrimental to society than the loss of life by innocent
people in need of an organ transplant, as will be discussed at length later in section IV of this
paper. It is inconsistent with morality to allow a needless death based on the possibility that
uninvolved individuals would be morally offended by the legalization of a market in human
organs, especially in a system that safeguards the well-being of all involved parties. Moral
opposition to the removal of a healthy organ pales in comparison to the moral taint of allowing
the death of patient in need.
Calabresi and Melamed propose that paternalism is another efficiency justification for
inalienability rules.53 Paternalism is based on the notion that the government (or another person)
knows better than an individual as to what is in her best interests. This concept represents the
belief that the government is caring for individuals by prohibiting them from selling or buying
human organs for their own safety, health or moral well-being. While one of the arguments
against permitting the sale of organs is that financial incentives limit the ability of the individual
to make an autonomous decision (as will be discussed later in section IV), paternalism, an
obvious limit on autonomy, is also used to oppose the market. In addition to its limits on
autonomy, paternalism is met with many criticisms, such as the ability of individuals to identify
their own best interests and the disruption of the person’s development of judgment by
paternalistic views. Although government decision makers may feel that they are behaving in
the best interests of those who would engage in the market by prohibiting the sale of organs, it is
difficult for government officials to place themselves in the position of the potential vendors or
buyers and evaluate their situations. Through my proposed regulation, the rules governing the

52
53

Ibid.
Ibid.
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Network would be capable and flexible enough to ensure the health and well-being of all
involved parties. Consequently, a broad prohibition on paternalism grounds is too extreme.
IV.

Concerns
An argument favoring a commercial market in organs will be met with an onslaught of

concerns, both practical and moral in nature. Although each concern is valid, the benefits of a
commercial market to solve the organ shortage and save countless lives seem to outweigh even
the most poignant criticism. Many of the practical worries of critics can easily be addressed
through strong administrative regulation. As is generally the case with unknown territory, the
“what if’s” often stretch beyond imagination to a worst-case scenario that would be far from the
typical experience of those engaging in the new market. Risk, danger, and crime are inescapable
realities in this world but should not halt progress based on the possibility of illegal abuses that
could fall through the cracks in a regulatory scheme.
a. Practical Concerns
One of the most concerning arguments against the commercialization of organ
transplantation is that permitting the sale would result in lower quality organs being available
and would expose the “vendors” to unnecessary health risks.54 Susan Rose-Ackerman cites this
potential problem as one of the justifications for modified inalienability, contrasting the blood
market and finding it unlikely that people would donate something of high quality that does not
regenerate.55 This argument would extend to purely voluntary donations as well as sales.
However, if the individual giving up his or her organ received ample incentive to undergo the
procedure, be it an altruistic feeling from donation or monetary compensation, even those with
54

MARK J. CHERRY, KIDNEY FOR SALE: HUMAN ORGANS, TRANSPLANTATION AND THE MARKET 13 (2005); WHEN
ALTRUISM ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CASE FOR COMPENSATING KIDNEY DONORS 58 – 60 (Sally Satal ed. 2008).
55
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healthy organs would be willing. In the cases of unhealthy people wishing to either donate or
sell an organ, regulation and careful screening would work to ensure all organs meet the
necessary standards of quality.
Since there is no adequate example of regulation of a market in organs, critics point to
India, where an illegal, unrelated market is widespread, as evidence of the phenomenon of lower
quality organs made available through a commercial market. However, in India, “vendors” come
from the lower strata of society where health and nutrition are already compromised by
economic problems.56 Additionally, there are problems with informed consent among Indian
sellers. However, the problems reaching informed consent stem from the low levels of social
and literary skill in the country.57
A country such as India suffers from many problems that would not be present or of large
concern in the United States. Although there are, of course, poor and uneducated people in the
United States, it is not a problem of the magnitude that India must deal with and therefore the
difficulties that have resulted from paid organ transplants in India would be easily usurped in the
United States through proper screening methods and the traditional standards of medical care.
Under proper medical conditions, both for the operation and follow-up care, kidney
removal or the removal of a lobe of the liver is not dangerous.58 Mortality rates during the
surgical removal of a kidney is extremely low, approximately 0.03 percent, with other major
complications occurring in less than two percent of cases.59 Although older published reports

56

AUSTEN GARWOOD-GOWERS, LIVING DONOR ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION: KEY LEGAL AND ETHICAL ISSUES 184
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describe a morality rate as high as 11 percent during the removal of a lobe of the liver, more
recently, institutions with experienced surgeons report no donor moralities.60
If the biggest societal concern is health, the prohibition on organ sales seems contrary to
society’s goals. The ban on organ sales forces people to resort to the black market, both for
sellers and buyers, where proper medical procedures and follow-up care may not be available.61
If the preservation of the health of all parties is the primary target, commercialization poses
minimal risks. Through legalization, organ sales could be regulated and monitored by wellorganized programs that would ensure safety and health. If organ removal is deemed dangerous
and thus inappropriate for a healthy person to subject themselves to, free donations would pose
the same risks and therefore also be deemed wrong.62
Another argument against the sale of organs is that offering compensation for organs
would decrease the number of altruistic donations.63 Critics believe that putting altruism in
competition with a commercial market would decrease the number of purely altruistic donations.
This argument presumes a number of points, primarily that promoting altruism in the world is in
itself a good thing and that offering compensation for organs would undermine altruism. But
“even if promoting altruism is good, is it good enough to justify the loss of thousands of lives?”64
Because altruistic donations (during life) among strangers are almost unheard of65, critics
cannot be concerned that less of these types of donations will occur. Compensation cannot
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undermine a pre-existing system of free donations where one does not already exist.66 If such a
system of widespread, uncompensated donations already existed, commercialization would be
rendered unnecessary.67 Though in an ideal world there would be a sufficient number of
donations, the only realistic option for a world that falls short of this ideal is to offer an incentive
for organs to meet the needs of the medical community and the patients whose lives depend upon
transplantation. The organ market would permit an expanded range of possibilities, allowing
people to reap satisfaction from being an altruistic person through free donation or granting
people fiscal incentive to meet other needs in their lives.68
This argument also presumes that a sick patient’s relative would be less inclined to
donate an organ to save their loved-one’s life solely because compensation is available for that
organ. Because of the medical reality that organ transplants from a relative provide the closest
match to the patient’s body and therefore the lowest chance of organ rejection, altruistic
donations from family members would still be a common occurrence, with relatives hoping to
provide their loved ones with the most successful medical treatment and therefore the greatest
chance of survival.69 Additionally, many family members feel a connection to one another and
would voluntarily undergo an organ donation because of their desire to be a part of the medical
cure of their loved one.
Lastly, the presumption that an offer of compensation would undermine the amount of
altruism in the world overall overlooks the possibility of a pure, unselfish, even responsible,
motive for selling the organ. For example, in 1989, there was a scandal at Humana Wellington
Hospital in London after it was revealed that a purchased kidney was transplanted by doctors at
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the hospital.70 However, it was later discovered that the organ “vendor” was a Turkish peasant
who sold his kidney to pay for his sick daughter’s tuberculosis medicine and save her life.71 One
cannot assume a paid donation is not altruistic, just as a free donation does not guarantee
altruistic motives, as is the case of a person trying to make herself feel or look generous.72
b. Moral Concerns
The main moral objections stem from the belief that the sale of an organ would never be
truly voluntary and that organ donation ought only to be motivated by altruism.73 While altruism
concerns were addressed briefly in the prior section, this section will deal with the voluntariness
of an individual to undergo a compensated organ removal procedure. This paper will not address
‘voluntariness’ concerns arguing that a commercial market in organs promotes crimes such as
kidnapping and physical coercion, as this argument is “like arguing against all employment on
the grounds that there are some cases of slavery, or arguing against property because there are
some cases of theft.”74 Crime is ever present in society and the nature of the actions of criminals
implies that whether the organ market is legal or not, these horrific crimes will be an unfortunate
reality. The more legitimate dispute is whether voluntariness can ever be present when financial
incentives are present.
Consent requires three things – information, competence and voluntariness.75
Information and competence are easily obtained, even where compensation is offered. However,
the voluntariness element poses three problems: (1) financial incentives encourage people to do
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things that they otherwise would not do and therefore make a decision less autonomous; (2)
financial incentives can be coercive; and (3) financial incentives lead to exploitation. I will
address each problem in turn.
Although financial incentives provide encouragement to engage in conduct a person is
less likely to do without the incentive, the nature of any incentive in any context can pose the
same problem. The most omnipresent financial incentive in our society is employment. Many,
if not most, people would not go to work if they were not paid for their time and effort, however,
society does not view a salary as impermissibly incentivizing people.76
Paid research participants can be analogized to paid organ donors in that both individuals
subject their bodies to potential health risks for compensation. Similarly, individuals in both
contexts offer an invaluable service to humanity. In the context of paid research participants, a
similar debate regarding the voluntariness of the participant’s actions has erupted, offering a
valid overlap with the argument against organ sales:
People receive inducements all the time to do things they otherwise would not do, such as
parting with their goods or working under particular conditions for particular employers.
There is no suggestion in the vast majority of these cases that their being paid undermines
the voluntary nature of their actions.77
Incentives do not negate voluntariness simply because a person would seek another
course of action without the presence of the incentive. The underlying concept of an ‘incentive’
requires that people would not be inclined to act without the incentive. If a person would
undertake the identical course of action in spite of the lack of incentive, incentives would be
rendered both unnecessary and ineffective.
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Financial incentives are also often viewed as impermissibly coercive. These concerns of
coercion, however, cannot be limited to commercial transactions, as a person can be coerced to
give up an organ for emotional or moral reasons.78 In fact, an altruism-only system imposes
coercion on family and friends who know that, without their help, their loved-one faces pain,
suffering and potential death, yet this type of emotional coercive is not recognized as
impermissible or even undesirable.79
In the case of a donation, paid or otherwise, the doctor will speak to the donor to ensure
that they understand the risks and truly want to donate their organ. As a medical community, it
has been generally accepted that this informed consent eliminates any potential for coercion of
uncompensated donors and therefore should be extended to all individuals wishing to partake in
the transplantation process even if they receive compensation. The introduction of compensation
is no more coercive than an ethical or moral obligation and therefore should be treated similarly.
In some cases, individuals may find the moral guilt of allowing a relative to suffer rather than
donating an organ to be more coercive than the offer of a financial reward. For the true cases of
coercion through the offer of financial incentives, by decriminalizing organ sales, a regulatory
body that would govern the organ market could screen out these cases, just as they are currently
screened for uncompensated donation.80
A major criticism of the commodification of body parts is that the financial incentives
would exploit poor and less fortunate people.81 Taking advantage of a person’s situation is not
per se wrong or exploitative, as in the situation of an emergency room doctor, an emergency
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plumber or a roadside vehicle-repair service.82 Many providers of emergency services
overcharge the customer. For example, if a pipe in a person’s home bursts in the middle of the
night or on a weekend, an emergency plumber is available to rectify the situation, but only for an
outrageous price well above the normal rates a plumber would charge during ordinary business
hours. While people may view the situation as unfair, these practices are permitted to continue
and are even justified based on the provision of a service in a necessary and exigent
circumstance.
Additionally, society does not view a demeaning job that pays minimum wage as
impermissibly83 exploitive simply because poor people who have no alternative form of
employment will be drawn to and accept the less-than-desirable working conditions.
Exploitation, rather, is taking unfair advantage of a person’s misfortune, such as the case where
an individual is overcharged, underpaid, or mistreated in some manner.84 These concerns can be
addressed by instituting a fixed price for an organ to ensure that vulnerable people are given fair
value.85
The mere fact that poor populations would be more drawn to organ sales does not render
the market exploitive. Poor populations commonly accept less desirable employment, live in
substandard housing and consume less than nutritious foods and yet none of these situations are
viewed as exploitive to the point where these jobs, housing projects, or types of food must be
improved or eliminated. Economic classes are a reality and acceptance that lower classes of
people are attracted, by necessity, to less desirable ways of life does not preclude the
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establishment of a system that would help society as a whole. Though the privileged may view
housing projects and organ sales as unacceptable forms of life, people from different walks of
life not only accept their economic status but are grateful for a minimum wage job or housing
allowance that permit them to take care of their families. Similarly, organ sales would allow
another avenue that may take advantage of a poor person’s situation, though not unfairly, but
would not be viewed by the individuals partaking as exploitive in the traditional sense.
Though some critics of the commercial organ market argue otherwise, having no
practical alternative is not per se exploitive or coercive. A person, no matter how dire their
situation, is capable of rendering an autonomous decision after being fully informed of the
consequences, risks and benefits. For example, if an ill patient’s sole alternative to death is a
particular treatment, the person cannot reject the treatment86 but the choice to pursue it is still an
autonomous choice because informed consent, requiring careful deliberation, correct
understanding of the options and no manipulation, is possible.87 Even where less extreme
circumstances prevail, the simple fact that a decision is appealing and could improve the
individual’s life does not strip that person of free will. One need only look to the dying patient’s
medical options, the person who plays the lottery, or an employee who accepts a large salary to
see that the mere fact that an offer is attractive does not mean that it cannot be voluntarily and
validly accepted.88 Similarly, choosing the sale of an organ, though it will undoubtedly be a
more attractive option to certain types of people, is still a voluntary and valid choice.
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In the eyes of many, an organ sale might be the best choice for their situation and we
must accept that “commodification may be bad, but starving is worse.”89 Although some people
may not understand the choice to sell an organ, others would welcome the choice, weigh the pros
and cons, and potentially act on their option if it is the best course of action for their unique
situation. The mere fact that the privileged may not understand this choice does not undermine
the autonomous nature of the choice by those who view it as a viable option given their
circumstances. This type of paternalism, through the prevention of sales of organs, is easily
justified from the comforts of a Congressman’s home but may actually harm those it seeks to
protect. Rather than a strict prohibition based on moral concerns, our government’s paternal
regulation should seek to protect those who would consider this a viable option, instead of
pushing them towards a risky black market.
c. Philosophical Arguments
Various well-known philosophies provide additional, albeit slightly more abstract,
criticism against and in support of a market in human organs. This section will discuss the
positions of Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274), John Locke (1632-1704), though neither of these
philosophers directly spoke about organ transplantation, given the time frame of their works, and
Immanuel Kant (1724 – 1804), whose philosophical stances oppose the commodification of body
parts. These traditional theories, however, as I will show, prohibit the donation of organs as
well. Unless society is prepared to recognize that the removal of organs from a living person is
morally impermissible for any reason, these philosophical arguments cannot be used to prohibit
the establishment of an open market in organs. This section will also address the ideas of various
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utilitarian philosophers and Robert Nozick (1938-2002), whose theories provide a justification
for commercialization.
i. Philosophical Arguments Challenging Commodification
Thomas Aquinas’s principle of totality requires a person to preserve the wholeness of the
body.90 In Aquinas’s view, it is prima facie morally impermissible to remove a healthy part of
the body that maintains its natural disposition because the human being as a whole biologically
functioning unit is a natural good.91 This argument, however, would extend to prohibit any
removal of organs from a live donor, whether a free donation or a compensated transaction.
Subscribing to this principle would undermine the entire medical transplantation community.
Though the traditional principles of Aquinas would have strictly viewed organ sale or
donation as morally impermissible, the principle of totality has evolved to encompass changing
concerns and possibilities in society. In light of medical advances, contemporary Thomists have
reinterpreted this principle to signify a need to preserve human biological functioning rather than
anatomical wholeness.92 The natural good recognized by the principle of totality, therefore,
should be viewed as the good of every aspect of life, including “bodily health and freedom from
pain that betokens organic malfunctioning or injury”.93 “So the transplantation of a duplicated
organ such as the kidney, leaving the whole substantially unimpaired, need not be regarded as
doing harm for the sake of good.”94 The contemporary reinterpretation of the principle of totality
is neutral as to whether the organ is donated or sold for sufficient reason. As long as the organ is
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removed for a good purpose, it is irrelevant whether the organ directly fulfills the purpose
(saving a relative’s life through donation) or accomplishes it with an additional step (for
example, obtaining funds for necessary care through the sale).
With a similar belief in the basis of morality as Aquinas, John Locke espouses theories
based on natural law. The core of Locke’s philosophy relevant to the discussion of organ
transplantation has two aspects. First, although a person has control over herself in the state of
nature, entrance into civil society requires a person to sacrifice some of the basis natural liberties
afforded in the state of nature.95 Second, Locke believes people have particular duties in
exchange for living in civil society, including the duty to support the national good of individual
liberty which constrains the freedoms a person has to use her body.96 The State therefore can
limit personal liberty and enforce certain moral obligations, like the duty not to kill oneself
which may extend, in a modern context, to a duty not to dispose of parts of the body.97 Locke
argues against suicide, believing that the rights a person has over themselves and their body end
at the limits of natural theology because only God has absolute dominion.98
Importantly, Locke believed that, in the state of nature, “every man has a property in his
own person: this nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body, and the work of his
hands, we may say are properly his.”99 Only through fully consenting to civil society and
government do people surrender these natural, personal liberties.100 Society’s sole purpose is to
provide for the property, life and liberty of individuals and therefore these liberties are sacrificed
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only as far as need be to achieve these goals.101 Government must act through promulgated laws
and cannot take property from a person without individual consent.102
Under a contemporary interpretation, Locke’s philosophy could equate organ
transplantation to suicide, as the removal (or receipt) of an organ interferes with God’s absolute
dominion over the body and thus individuals do not have the right to disturb the body in any
manner. However, transplantation, whether compensated or otherwise, should be viewed as the
discharge of a moral duty to promote the good of society through charity and aid to those who
are in need. Though some may debate whether people actually have freely consented to civil
society at all as there appears to be no alternative in this modern world, consent to living in civil
society cannot strip an individual of such a fundamental rights in their own body. If society’s
purpose is to protect the property, life and liberty of an individual, revocation of property rights
in the thing that seems most our own – our body – not only does not perpetuate these goals, but
seems to detract from the preservation of each one of them. Property is not adequately defended
if society takes the most fundamental piece of property that even the poorest man is always
ensured of the possession of. Life is not shielded if transplantation of life-saving organs is
prevented. Lastly, liberty is not preserved if an individual loses the freedom to do with her body
as she pleases. In the United States, people have surely not consented to allowing the
government to take their bodies as it pleases103 and therefore the State should not have
jurisdiction over organ transplantation if an individual freely decides on this disposition of her
body.
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Immanuel Kant’s arguments, like Aquinas’s, find both the sale and donation of human
organs to be morally impermissible. Although still defending Christian ideals, Kant distances
himself from the Christianity-based philosophy of Aquinas and Locke, instead viewing morality
as an individual’s responsible choice rather than a means to seek salvation.104 Because it is
intrinsically wrong to remove an organ, even a choice to donate an organ to a family member
would be considered a morally inappropriate way to use oneself. Kant’s argument against the
removal of organs has two basic elements. First, the removal of an organ constitutes partial selfmurder to the same degree as suicide.105 Second, the removal uses the person impermissibly as a
means rather than an end.106
Kant’s concept of the categorical imperative decries the obligations that people must live
under and assess their motivations and actions against. The categorical imperative consists of
three formulations:
Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same
time will that it should become a universal law.
Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own
person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an
end and never simply as a means.
This is done in the present (third) formulation of the principle,
namely, in the idea of the will of every rational being as a will that
legislates universal law.107
The removal of an organ would violate the categorical imperative if any of the following
are true: (1) the removal puts life in danger, (2) parts of body are equivalent to oneself for
morality purposes, or (3) donation or sale of organ is not associated with discharge of a duty.108
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Two of these objections are easily dismissed. Under today’s sophisticated medical
technology, the removal of an organ does not pose a great danger109 and thus should not be used
as an argument against the donation or sale of organs, thus eliminating objection (1). I believe
objection (3) would be blatantly rejected by most individuals. The donation of an organ to a
dying loved one could very easily be viewed as a moral duty. Many, if not most, people would
feel a moral and social obligation to donate an organ to save a loved one’s life if they are able.
Similarly, the sale of an organ to, referring back to the prior example of the Turkish peasant,
acquire monetary funds for a lifesaving treatment for a family member could also be viewed as
the duty of a loyal father. Moreover, no matter the motivation, the donation or sale of an organ
for transplantation into a sick or dying individual could be viewed as a discharge of a duty to
promote the general health of mankind and to help fellow citizens live a pain-free existence.
The second objection reintroduces the arguments of Aquinas and Locke requiring the
preservation of the body as a natural good. Because not all body parts are essential for the body
to function biologically (and presumably, only these types of “unnecessary” organs would be
available for sale), morality in the person would not be compromised.110 Morality in the body is
compromised only when the body as a functioning whole is harmed. However, if the donated
organ is not essential to the well-being of the body, the body as a whole is maintained.
Similarly, Kant’s term ‘partial self-murder’ seems to imply that the individual is harmed
or ‘killed’ in some respect. However, based on the nature of these organs, the body can remain a
functioning whole and therefore is not ‘murdered’ in any manner. Although it may be immoral
to harm oneself for no purpose, the donation of an organ takes from one living body that can do
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without the organ to give to another body that will die without the benefit of that organ;
therefore, rather than a harm occurring, there is an overall benefit from the transaction. If this
form of ‘partial self-murder’ will save one life by merely blemishing the body of another living
individual, an abstract concept of the morality of preserving the whole of a body should not
prevent this measure.
Although treating a person as a means is not permitted, it is permitted as long as they are
also treated as an end.111 According to Kant, the problem with focusing on a person’s
instrumental value and usefulness is neglecting the person’s autonomous nature that is deserving
of respect.112 This same argument identifies the problem with slavery. Slavery treats a human
being whom is worthy of respect as being worthy merely of a use.113
Kant believes that everything has either a ‘price’ or a ‘dignity’.114 Everything with a
price can be replaced but anything that is above a price and has no equivalent has a dignity.115
Allowing the removal of organs would be, in Kant’s view, inappropriately ascribing a price to a
person’s body, which should have a dignity rather than a price. However, treating people as
fungible is not an ethical issue in many contexts, for example, it does not matter which taxi
driver drives you to your destination, which barber cuts your hair, or which bellhop carries your
luggage.116 Additionally, treating a single organ as a unit with a ‘price’ should not be viewed as
morally questionable when the uniqueness of the individual as a whole is respected and
preserved.
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Moreover, because a market in organs would increase the supply of necessary organs and
eliminate risks of people who resort to the black market, the creation of the market “advantages
the health and integrity of persons as ends in themselves.”117 Participation in the black market
threatens the health of both the recipient and the donor. A well-regulated market would ensure
respect for the “vendors” as persons and would promote the good of the health of the recipients.
On the other hand, the current scheme forces people devoted to the idea of the sale of an organ to
the black market where the individual is treated as a “means” and generally not provided
adequate follow-up care that would be indicative of respect for the person. Allowing the death
or substandard care of those in need of an organ transplant strips the person of the respect owed
to their good health and standard of living.
ii. Philosophy Supporting Commodification
One of the clearest defenses of the sale of organs lies in utilitarianism. Jeremy Bentham,
the founder of utilitarianism, based his principles on the axiom, “it is the greatest happiness of
the greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong.”118 Happiness was defined as the
predominance of “pleasure” over “pain.”119 Bentham establishes a set of criteria to measure the
extent of pleasure or pain that will result from a particular action.120 The criteria are categorized
by intensity, duration, certainty, proximity, productiveness, purity and extent.121 In the context
of organ transplantation, the greatest happiness would be achieved by allowing the
transplantation of a necessary organ and permitting the vendor of the organ to receive
compensation that she needs to fulfill whatever purpose is important to her. Both parties would
117

CHERRY, supra note 54, at 136.
JEREMY BENTHAM, preface to A FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT (Ross Harrison ed., Cambridge University Press
1988) (1781).
119
JEREMY BENTHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION 1 (Nabu Press 2010) (1789).
120
Ibid.
121
Ibid.
118

32

receive a benefit from the fulfillment of their end of the bargain. The pain experienced during
the operation and follow-up care of the vendor would be far less than that which would have
been suffered by the recipient over years of organ failure and potential death.
Some critics argue that utilitarianism would permit the killing of one person to harvest
organs to save the lives of many. However, Bentham believed the law would define inviolable
rights, such as the fundamental right to life, which would protect the well-being of individuals.122
John Stuart Mill, a proponent of Bentham’s theories, focused on the freedom of the
person as an individual in his work, On Liberty.123 Mill strongly opposed state paternalism,
writing, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others;”124 therefore, paternalism
should be permitted only to govern behavior that could harm the interests of other people.
Justifying his rejection of paternalism, Mill believed that allowing people to make their own
decisions would create the most good.125 Individuals not only know their best interests better
than the state does but also moral equality requires that the state respect people’s liberty
interests.126 Mills’ emphasis on autonomy displays one of the core arguments for a market in
human organs by stressing the importance of respecting an individual’s decisions. The sale of an
organ is not injurious to others and therefore, according to the philosophy of Mill, the state has
no interest in governing this type of choice for people.
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Another utilitarian, Felix Cohen, in the essay “Dialogue on Private Property” wrote,
“property rights should be arranged to promote a proper combination of social goals such as
welfare, justice and economic productivity.”127 In accords with utilitarian ideals, the merits of an
arrangement should be judged according to how well it promotes the “good life” of those
affected by it.128 As opposed to natural law which views property as a relation between an owner
and the owned object, Cohen believed property should be seen as bundles of legal relations
between the owner and non-owners.129 130 The legalization of a market in human organs would
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

The right to possess;
The right to use;
The right to manage;
The right to receive the income or benefits of;
The right to the capital, in that the owner has the power to alienate the thing and
the liberty to consume waste or destroy;
6. The right to security, meaning that owner can look forward to being owner
indefinitely;
7. The incident of transmissibility, that the interest can be transmitted to the
holder’s successors;
8. The incident of absence of term, meaning ownership does not cease to be valid
at a future date or at the occurrence of an event;
9. The duty to prevent harm, requiring that the owner not use the thing to harm
others and must prevent others from using it for harm;
10. Liability to executive, that it can be taken away from the owner for debt;
11. The residuary character, meaning “either immediately or ultimately, the
extinction of other interests would inure to the owner’s benefit”.
Honoré admitted that people can have very strong interests in things, such as our bodies, that do not fit the
traditional forms of ownership but believed these interests cannot rise to the level of ownership because people are
not free to dispose of their bodies. Though suicide is technically unlawful and therefore people may be viewed as
unfree to dispose of their bodies in a traditional sense, attempted suicides are not prosecuted. Nor are people
prohibited from voluntarily removing body parts, such as fingers or toes, for ceremonial or even masochistic
purposes, though it may be looked upon as unnatural. If people are not authorized to make decisions regarding the
disposition of their bodies, wishes at death for either cremation or burial would not be respected because the
individual would lack the capacity to decide the means of disposal of her body. Although a body is viewed
differently after death, the ability to dispose of the body after death should be seen as a property right and extended
to the living body, which also fits the requisite characteristics of property. Additionally, if we accept that people are
not free to dispose of their bodies, people would never be permitted to remove an organ, for donation or otherwise,
because the removal constitutes a partial disposition of the body.
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promote the welfare and “good” of those involved by granting the recipient the opportunity to
obtain the necessary organ much sooner than under the present system of donation and by
permitting the “vendor” a chance for financial enrichment while helping someone in need.
Dispensing with the complicated scheme of moral ideals, Robert Nozick’s market theory
provides a convincing, modern philosophical defense of a commercial market in live organs. In
Anarchy, State, and Utopia, Nozick espouses the basis of morality in a transaction as the
agreement by all involved parties to collaborate and grant permission.131 Therefore, all market
transactions are moral if all parties consent to the transaction.132 For validity, parties need not
have the same values, culture or religion, but need only to agree on the content of the
agreement.133 The agreement itself provides the moral justification for the transaction.
In contrast to the beliefs of Kant, Nozick believes that people can use an individual, but
only with their consent, in order to respect them as free individuals.134 People should be
permitted to choose their conduct freely in their own best interests even if they choose in ways

Most of the legal rights and obligations from Honoré’s list can be applied to the context of an organ. A
person obviously possesses, uses, and manages their organs and body. More abstractly but no less clearly, a person
has the right to reap the benefits of their organs (life), can waste or destroy their organs (for example, by use of
drugs or alcohol), and are assured that they will forever have their organs, unless voluntarily removed130. The
interest in an organ or the body as a whole can be subscribed to one’s successors by allowing them to choice the
manner of disposal of a deceased person’s body. On a similar note, an individual forever owns their body, as the
law recognizes the fact that people can decide what should happen to their body after their death. However, some of
these rights and obligations do not seem applicable. For example, a person cannot do harm with their organs130 so
the duty to prevent harm is inapplicable. Although a person’s organs cannot be taken for debts, a person’s body can
be restrained for commission of a crime (as in imprisonment) or entirely taken away (as in the death penalty).
Though all of the characteristics of the list do not flawlessly apply to organs, Honoré wrote “the list incidents [the 11
components], though they may be together sufficient, are not individual necessary conditions for the person of
inherence to be designated the owner of a particular thing.” Tony Honoré, Ownership, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1384,
1386-90 (1961).
131

ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1977).
Ibid.
133
CHERRY, supra note 54, at 140.
134
NOZICK, supra note 131, at 57-58.
132

35

other people consider unwise.135 Nozick’s “nonpateralistic position holds that someone may
choose (or permit another) to do to himself anything, unless he has acquired an obligation to
some third party not to do or allow it.”136 Rather than charging the State with the authority to
implement and create moral policies, Nozick thinks that the government can only legitimately
exercise power that the people freely transfer to it, requiring that actual persons give actual
consent to the policy or that the policies protect the rights of persons not to be touched or used
without permission.137 As a result of the limitations imposed on government, it has no general
authority to intrude on the consensual transactions of people. The market, therefore, should exist
free from intrusion as a place for consensual interaction. Morality exists through this market
allowing people to pursue their own goals without requiring a shared moral outlook.138 Because
morality is irrelevant, a commercial organ market would be permitted without an analysis of the
moral underpinnings of the business deal as long as it can be ascertained that both individuals
freely consent to the transaction.
V.

Conclusion
The living human body itself is not a commodity. However, organs non-essential to basic

living (or after the death of the individual) can be treated as a commodity without any threat to
existence and with benefits streaming to all involved parties in the transaction. The property
rights of an individual in his or her own body must be acknowledged to avoid the contradiction
of acknowledgement of property rights for gift purposes but rejecting these rights for commercial
purposes. Though not a popular idea, nothing can more fundamentally represent property
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ownership than something that cannot be taken and that an individual has no matter where they
go. Every traditional identifying characteristic of property can be applied to a human organ – an
organ is possessed by139 the body that contains it, controlled by that individual, the individual
can exclude others from access to the organ, the individual enjoys the benefits and uses of the
organ and can dispose of the organ through legal donation or unconventional removal. The
definition of property wholly applies to human organs and that right of ownership cannot be
stripped from an individual because of an abstract belief that the human body transcends
ownership. Although human organs may be viewed as inalienable property, I have attempted to
diffuse the underlying justifications for inalienability in this context, primarily quality control
and distribution issues.
Once it is accepted that the reality of the organ shortage can only be fully addressed
through a drastic measure, the establishment of a commercial market in organs should be
analyzed as a viable option. Because an individual has property rights in their body, the law
should not outright refuse the ability to sell organs where no interest is implicated in protecting
the individual from the actual removal of the organ. Rather, legislation should ensure the wellbeing of those involved through regulation instead of prohibition. The practical and moral
concerns presented by critics could be remedied through a well-designed regulatory system,
essentially as an expansion of the current Organ Procurement and Transplantation Network
which already provides the framework necessary to make the market successful. Many of the
philosophical arguments prove to be contradictory in a world where organ donation is
encouraged and transplantation is viewed as commonplace and desirable. Instead, some modern
philosophical regimes demonstrate the moral justification for the practice.
Though this may not be the traditionally terminology, because the body literally “has” or contains the organ,
using the language of the bundle of property rights, the body can be seen to possess this organ.
139
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The commercialization of body parts may seem extreme to many people for sentimental
and practical reasons. However, the market for regenerable body tissue was once viewed as such
but since its institution many years ago, the market has been successful and thriving. The
extension of this market to include human organs would begin to address the gross shortages that
cost our country thousands of innocent lives every year and an immeasurable amount of pain for
those patiently waiting for an available organ. Commodification does not provide one-sided
benefits only to the recipient; granting the option of a sale to the organ owners would be in the
interests of all involved parties. Because all of the practical, moral and philosophical arguments
against commodification can be met with an equally convincing response, the only remaining
barrier to the legalization of this market is sentiment. It is indisputable that the human body is
irreplaceable and precious. To maintain standards of society, the body should not be disturbed
without good cause, strictly for profit. But, what better cause exists than saving a life while
improving your own situation?
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